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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
v. 
BRIAN WILLIAM DRAKE 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CASE NO. 20000298-CA 
PRIORITY NO. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-
2a-3(2)(e) (1996), which authorizes this Court to review appeals from criminal 
convictions not involving a first degree or capital felony. A jury convicted the Appellant, 
Brian William Drake of forgery, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-501 (1999), 
and of theft by deception, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-405 (1999). Both 
crimes are third degree felonies. A copy of the judgment is attached as Addendum A. 
ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION 
Issue 1: Did the trial judge err in failing to properly instruct the jury regarding the 
elements of the crimes? The trial court commits reversible error as a matter of law if it 
fails to instruct the jury on all elements of a crime. State v. Jones. 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 
(Utah 1991). The trial judge below failed to instruct the jury that to convict Mr. Drake as 
an accomplice to the crimes charges, it must find that he solicited, requested, encouraged, 
commanded, or intentionally aided the principal actor in committing the crime. 
Standard of Review and Preservation: This issue was not raised below. When jury 
instructions are not objected to in the trial court, this court will review the claimed error 
to avoid manifest injustice. Utah R. Crim. Pro. 19(c). Manifest injustice, requiring 
reversal as a matter of law, occurs when the trial judge fails to accurately instruct the jury 
on all of the elements of a crime. State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 354-55 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). 
Issue 2: Did Mr. Drake receive ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel's 
failure to object to the faulty jury instructions that did not fully instruct the jury on the 
elements of the charged offenses and trial counsel's failure to obtain witnesses that could 
testify on Mr. Drake's behalf. 
Preservation/Standard of Review: This issue was not raised below. In reviewing an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Court must find that (1) counsel made errors 
so serious that the defendant was deprived of his Sixth Amendment guarantee to counsel 
and (2) that the performance prejudiced the defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 
Issue 3: Did the State's primary witness's contradictory statements and false testimony 
establish sufficient evidence to prove Mr. Drake's guilt. The State's primary witness, 
who offered the only evidence connecting Mr. Drake to the crimes, offered several 
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conflicting stories, testified falsely at the preliminary hearing and at trial, and first 
revealed the vital details of the crimes at trial. This Court must reverse a conviction for 
insufficient evidence if the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt or 
innocense of the charges. 
Standard of Review: In reviewing a conviction for sufficient evidence, this Court, 
while viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, determines whether "the 
evidence is so inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime." State v. Giles, 
966 P.2d 872, 876 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
Preservation: This issue was preserved for appeal when counsel moved the Court 
to dismiss the charges against Mr. Drake based on insufficiency of the evidence and the 
State's failure to make out a prima facie case. R. 150: 119. 
RELEVANT STATUTES. RULES 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following statutes and constitutional provisions are contained in the 
Addenda: 
Addendum G: Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1999). 
Addendum H: Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999). 
Addendum I: Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1999). 
Addendum J: Utah Const, art. I, § 7. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In an information filed on February 5, 1999, the State charged Mr. Drake with one 
count each of forgery and theft by deception. R.6. The trial court conducted a jury trial 
on November 15, 1999. R.150.1 The jury convicted Mr. Drake of both charges. R. 150: 
159-60. ThetnaljudgesentencedMr. Drake on March 3, 2000. R. 150: 169. Mr. Drake 
filed a timely notice of appeal the same day. R. 135. On December 21, 2000, Mr. Drake 
filed a Motion to Remand for Findings Necessaiy to Determination of Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel. This motion was denied in an order dated January 18, 2001. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
From 1990 to 1997, Patricia Westlake lived in an apartment located at 149 South 
and 700 East in Salt Lake City. R. 150:107. During this period, Ms. Westlake had an 
account with Providian National Bank of Tilton, New Hampshire. R.150. 108. Some 
time prior to April of 1998, Ms. Westlake closed the account, but Providian continued to 
mail her cash advance checks for $3,000 to entice her to reopen her account. R. 150: 109. 
Ms. Westlake's mail was delivered to hei residence through a slot in her apartment door. 
R. 150: 108. The checks invited Ms. Westklake to reestablish her relationship with 
Providian by signing the checks and depositing them into her financial institution. R. 
150: 109. Ms. Westlake declined each of Providian's solicitation. R. 150: 109. 
!The volume marked "150" contains both the trial and sentencing transcripts. The 
internl page numbers of that volume are listed after "R. 150." 
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In August of 1997, Ms. Westlake moved out of her apartment into a new 
residence. R. 150: 107. At some unspecified time, Mr. Drake moved into the apartment. 
Ms. Westlake and Mr. Drake did not know each other. R. 150: 112. The parties 
stipulated below that Mr. Drake was living in the apartment from April 12, 1998 to May 
1, 1998. R. 150: 112-13. There is no evidence of who lived at the residence between Ms. 
Westlake's departure in August of 1997 and April 28, 1998. 
On April 28, 1998, an acquaintance of Mr. Drake, Catherine Tousley, used an 
ATM at the America First Credit Union in the Brickyard Plaza to deposit into her account 
one of the $3,000 checks addressed to Ms. Westlake from Providian. R. 150: 70-71; 
Exhibits 1,3. The check was dated March 27, 1998 and purportedly had been signed over 
to Ms. Tousley by Ms. Westlake. R. 150: 94; Exhibit 1. The following day, Ms. Tousley 
went to a different America First location and withdrew $2,500 from her account. R. 
150: 72; Exhibit 3. 
The next day, April 30, 1998, Ms. Tousley deposited another $3,000 check from 
Providian to Ms. Westlake in a different America First ATM. R. 150: 93-94. That check 
was identical to the first but was dated April 27, 1998. Exhibit 2. Like the first check, 
Ms. Westlake had purportedly signed it over to Ms. Tousley. R. 150: 93-94. 
The bank teller who processed the check became suspicious because cash advance 
checks are rarely signed over to other people. R. 150: 94. Since Ms. Westlake also had 
an account at America First, the teller compared Ms. Westlake's signature on other 
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financial documents on file within the bank with the signature on the back of the check 
and determined that the signature had been forged. R. 150: 94-95. The teller then placed 
a hold on the check and alerted Ms. Westlake to the forgeries. R. 150: 95-96. 
Following these incidents, America First's director of security telephones Ms. 
Tousley to inquire about the forgeries. R. 150:98, 103. Ms. Tousley falsely stated that 
she had lent her ATM card and personal identification number to some unspecified 
friends and she did not know what they had done with the card. R. 150: 104-05. 
Following this conversation, the security director left several telephone messages for Ms. 
Tousley but Ms. Tousley failed to return the calls. R. 150: 105. 
A police detective met with Ms. Tousley at the police station on January 8, 1999. 
R. 150: 115. After receiving Miranda warnings, Ms. Tousley admitted to forging and 
depositing the first $3,000 check. R. 150: 116-17. According to her, after she deposited 
the check, Mr. Drake and Mr. Drake's friend drove her to America First. R. 150: 116-17. 
Ms. Tousley represented that she had worked with Mr. Drake at a Taco Bell restaurant. 
R. 150: 116. She then falsely claimed tlliat she withdrew the entire $3,000 in two separate 
transactions and gave it all to Mr. Drake. R. 150: 117. Bank records showed that she 
withdrew only $2,500 in one transaction. Exhibit 3.2 
2Although Ms. Tousley made three withdrawals following the deposit of the first 
$3,000 check, only one appears to correspond to the forged check. Exhibit 3 shows that 
Ms. Tousley deposited $3,000 on April 28, 1998 and then withdrew $2,500 the following 
day. The next day, April 30, 1998, she withdrew $301.50 and then deposited the other 
$3,000 check. Later that day, she withdrew another $110.00. 
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Following this interview, the police arrested Mr. Drake and charged him with 
forgery and theft by deception for the deposit and withdrawal of the first check only. R. 
5, 6. At a preliminary hearing, Ms. Tousley reiterated her false claim that she withdrew 
the entire $3,000 in one transaction and had given it all to Mr. Drake. R. 150: 87. She 
contended further that she had printed on the back of the first check, "payed [sic] to the 
order of Cathi Tousley" and then endorsed the check. R. 150: 81-82. Some unknown 
person had forged Ms. Westlake's signature. Based on Ms. Tousley's claims, the trial 
court bound over Mr. Drake on both charges. R. 19. 
Approximately a month before trial, the police interviewed Ms. Tousley again to 
clarify her story. R. 150: 66, 117-18. For the first time, Ms. Tousley admitted that she 
had withdrawn only $2,500 from her account and had kept $500 as payment for 
depositing the first check. 
At trial, Ms. Tousley served as the State's primary witness against Mr. Drake. She 
acknowledged giving false information to the police and to perjuring herself at the 
preliminary hearing. R. 150: 66. Despite her previous lies, Ms. Tousley claimed that she 
would testify truthfully at trial. R. 150: 66. 
Contrary to her statement to the police, Ms. Tousley testified that she had never 
seen Mr. Drake at Taco Bell and she did not remember ever meeting him there. R. 150: 
67-68. In fact, she maintained that she had never told the police that she had worked with 
Mr. Drake. R. 160: 85. Instead, she indicated that she simply informed the police that 
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she had known Mr. Drake for a year and she considered him a friend. R. 150: 86. 
Ms. Tousley claimed that on April 28, 1998, Mr. Drake approached her and asked 
her to deposit the first $3,000 check into her account because he did not have a bank 
account in Utah and because Ms. Westlake owed him money. R. 150: 68-70. In 
exchange for Ms. Tousely's services, Mr. Drake offered to let her keep $500. R. 150: 70. 
Contrary to her preliminary hearing testimony, Ms. Tousley testified that when she 
received the check someone had already printed on it "payed [sic] to the order o f and she 
had signed Ms. Westlake's signature. R. 150: 70-71, 79. A casual inspection of the 
check indicates that the phrase "payed [sic] to the order of Cathi Tousley" appeared to be 
printed in the same handwriting. Exhibit 1. Nevertheless, Ms. Tousley claimed to have 
printed only her name on the check. R. 150: 70-71. She the endorsed the check below 
Ms. Westlake's signature. R. 150: 70-71; Exhibit 1. Ms. Tousely's endorsement appears 
to be substantially different from the handwriting of her name. Exhibit 1. 
The next day, April 29, 1998, Ms. Tousley went to the downtown branch of 
America First to withdraw the money. R. 150: 72. In conflict with her initial statement to 
the police that Mr. Drake and a friend drove her to the bank, Ms. Tousley asserted at trial 
that she met Mr. Drake there. R. 150: 72 She also denied ever telling the police that Mr. 
Drake had driven her to the bank. R. 150: 88. At the bank, she withdrew $2,500 and 
gave it to Mr. Drake. R. 150: 72. 
Ms. Tousley testified that later that same day, Mr. Drake gave her the second 
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$3,000 check to deposit because Ms. Westlake still owed him money. R. 150: 72-74. Ms. 
Tousley asserted that she printed and signed her name on the check and deposited it into 
an ATM that day. R. 150: 74. Contrary to this testimony, the bank records establish that 
Ms. Tousley deposited the check on April 30, not April 29. Exhibit 3. 
On May 1, 1998, Ms. Tousley telephoned America First and learned that a hold 
had been placed on the second check. R. 150: 74. Mr. Drake came to Ms. Tousley's 
house later that day and she explained the situation to him. R. 150: 74-75. Ms. Tousley 
alleged for the first time that Mr. Drake became angry upon hearing this news and 
threatened to hurt her. R. 150: 75, 87-88. She alleged further that Mr. Drake later left 
messages on her answering machine. 
Following the presentation of evidence, th trial judge reiterated the charges 
contained in the Information. R. 150: 123. Instruction number one explained that for 
forger the State had to prove that Mr. Drake, as "a party to the offense, did alter, make, 
complete, execute, authenticate, issue, transfer, publish, or utter any writing . . . 
purporting] to be the act of another, with a purpose to defraud." R. 86; Addendum B. 
As for theft by deception, the Information claimed that Mr. Drake, as "a party to the 
offense, obtained or exercised control over the property of America First Credit Union by 
deception, with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof. . . ." R. 86; Addendum B. 
Instruction number three required the State to prove "each of the essential 
allegations contained in the Information . . . beyond a reasonable doubt." R. 87; 
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Addendum C. In determining whether the State met this burden, the judge emphasized 
that the jury was to base its decision only in the evidence presented at trial and the law as 
stated in the jury instructions. R. 150: 88. 
Instruction number 19 defined the term "party" as any person, "acting with the 
mental state required for the commission of the offense who directly commits the offense, 
who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to 
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense. . . ." R. 103; Addendum D. 
The trial judge then listed for the jury the required elements to convict Mr. Drake 
of forgery: 
1. That on or about the 28th day of April, 1998, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the defendant, BRIAN WILLIAM DRAKE, intentionally or 
knowingly made, executed, issued or uttered a writing; and 
2. That said writing or utterance purported to be the act of Patrica R. 
Westlake; and 
3. That said writing or utterance was not the act of Patricia R. 
Westlake; and 
4. That said writing or utterance was not authorized by Patrica R. 
Westlake; and 
5. That the said defendant then and there knew the writing was not 
the act of Patricia R. Westlake and was not authorized by Patricia R. 
Westlake; and 
6. That the said defendant then and there had a purpose to defraud. 
R. 105; Addendum E. 
The trial judge similarly listed the required elements for the crime of theft by 
deception: 
1. That on or about the 28th day of April, 1998, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the defendant, BRIAN WILLIAM DRAKE, intentionally or 
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knowingly obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property of 
America First Credit Union; and 
2. That the defendant obtained or exercised control over such 
property by deception; and 
3. That the defendant obtained or exercised control over such 
property with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof; and 
4. That the value of the property was or exceeded $1,000.00 but was 
less than $5,000.00. 
R. 110; Addendum F. 
Immediately following the reading of the jury instructions, the Court conversed 
with counsel as follows: 
THE COURT: Counsel, do you both stipulate that I read the instructions 
substantially as written? 
MR. UPDEGROVE (Prosecutor): We do, Your Honor. 
MR. HALL: We do. 
THE COURT: You both waive any objections, if there are any? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: We do, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. All right. 
R. 150: 123. Mr. Drake's trial counsel waived any objection to the jury instructions as 
read and provided to the jury. 
During closing arguments, the prosecutor articulated his theory that Mr. Drake was 
a party to the offenses as an accomplice. R. 150: 130-31. He argued that Mr. Drake 
prompted Ms. Tousley to actually commit the crimes. R. 150: 125-26. Defense counsel 
countered that Ms. Tousley lacked credibility and could not be believed. R. 150: 144-45. 
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He urged the jury to reject Ms. Tousley's story given her repeated lies, claims raised for 
the first time at trial, and obvious motive to exonerate herself. R. 150: 146-47. 
The jury, nevertheless, convicted Mr. Drake of both charges,. R. 150: 159-60. 
The trial judge sentenced Mr. Drake to consecutive terms of up to five years in prison but 
suspended the sentences in lieu of three years probation. R. 150: 176; Addendum A. The 
judge also ordered Mr. Drake to pay a $500 fine and $2,917.05 in restitution. R. 150: 
177; Addendum A. This appeal followed. R. 135. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on th elements of the offenses. 
Because the State tried Mr. Drake under an accomplice theory, it had to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Mr. Drake aided and abetted Ms. Tousley in committing the crimes. 
The trial judge never required the jury, as a prerequisite to convicting Mr. Drake, to dins 
the aiding and abetting element. Even viewing the instructions as a whole, not reasonable 
juror could have understood that aiding and abetting was a required element of the 
offense. This omission deprived Mr. Drake of his constitutional rights to due process, a 
unanimous jury verdict, and a jury trial. 
Although Mr. Drake did not raise this issue in the trial court, the failure to instruct 
the jury on the elements of the offenses constitutes a manifest injustice which defendants 
can raise initially on appeal. Moreover, this failure requires reversal as a matter of law. 
Although on the surface some cases arguably disagree with this conclusion, they do not 
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apply to the failure to instruct the jury on the elements and they are readily distinguishable 
from this case. 
Reversal is required even under harmless error analysis because the evidence is 
controverted concerning Mr. Drake's guilt. Specifically, Ms. Tousley's repeated lies and 
the lack of independent evidence connecting Mr. Drake to the offenses bar the State from 
showing the failure to properly instruct the jury was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In any event, the State presented insufficient evidence to convict Mr. Drake. Ms. 
Tousley provided the only testimony or evidence connecting Mr. Drake to the forgery and 
theft. Ms. Tousley repeatedly lied to the bank security officer and to the police. She then 
perjured herself at the preliminary hearing and at trial. Ms. Tousley completely lacked 
credibility and her testimony had no probative value. 
The only other evidence that remotely linked Mr. Drake to the crimes was 
evidence that he lived at the same apartment where the first check was mailed a month 
after the mailing. The State presented no evidence showing who lived at the address at 
the time of the mailing, who had access to the apartment, or any other information to 
connect Mr. Drake to the check. This gap in the evidence prevented the State from 
establishing Mr. Drake's guilt. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. REVERSIBLE ERROR OCCURRED WHERE THE TRIAL JUDGE 
FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT IT MUST FIND BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT MR. DRAKE AIDED AND ABETTED MS. 
TOUSLEY, AND INSTEAD ERRONEOUSLY INFORMED THE JURY 
THAT TO CONVICT MR. DRAKE, IT MUST FIND THAT HE WAS THE 
PRINCIPAL ACTOR. 
Although the State tried Mr. Drake under an accomplice theory, the elements 
instructions for forgery and theft by deception failed to require the jury to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Mr. Drake aided or abetted Ms. Tousley in committing the 
forgeries. Because the instructions, whether viewed separately or as a whole, failed to 
require the jury to find an essential element to the crimes, reversal is required as a matter 
of law. Reversal is required, even applying harmless error analysis, given Ms. Tousley's 
complete lack of credibility and the absence of any evidence linking Mr. Drake to the 
crimes. 
A. The Trial Court Erred In Failing To Instruct the Jury That To Convict 
Mr. Drake It Must Find That Beyond a Reasonable Doubt He Aided 
and Abetted Ms. Tousley. 
The State theorized below that Mr. Drake did not directly commit the crimes, but 
rather that he convinced Ms. Tousley to deposit the check then withdraw the money from 
her account. R. 150:126-26. The State presented no evidence that Mr. Drake personally 
forged or deposited the check or withdrew the money. Thus, the evidence cannot support 
the convictions under a principal theory. Rather, to convict Mr. Drake, Utah Code 
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Annotated § 76-2-202 (1999) required the jury to find that he (1) "act[ed] with the mental 
state required for the commission of [the charged] offense[s];" and, (2) "solicited], 
requested], commanded], encourage[d], or intentionally aid[ed]" Ms. Tousley in 
committing the crimes. 
State and federal due process as well as the Utah Criminal Code require the State 
to prove all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24 
fflf 13, 14, 980 P.2d 191 (citing Utah Const, art. I, § 7; U.S. Const, amend. V, XIV; State 
v. Herrera. 895 P.2d 359, 368 (Utah 1995) ("due process mandates that the prosecution 
prove every element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt"); State v. 
Swenson, 838 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Utah 1992) (holding that State has burden of proving all 
elements of a crime); State v. Starks. 627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utah 1981) ("A fundamental 
precept of our criminal law is that the state must prove all elements of a crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt"); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1995) (requiring that each element of 
the offense charged be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, including "[t]he conduct, 
attendant circumstances, and [t]he culpable mental state required")). 
This right, in turn, requires trial judges to instruct the jury "what each element is 
and that each must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . ." State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 
33, 35 (Utah 1980). While all of the elements need not appear in a single instruction, 
reversible error occurs where the instructions fail to communicate to the jury "the basic 
elements of the crime." State v. Harmon. 712 P.2d 291, 292 (Utah 1986). 
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In listing the required elements for convicting Mr. Drake of forgery and theft by 
deception, the trial judge failed to instruct the jury that to convict Mr. Drake as an 
accomplice it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he solicited, requested, 
commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided Ms. Tousley in committing the crimes. 
While Instruction number 19 informed the jury that an individual could be convicted as a 
party for either directly committing an offense or for aiding and abetting another, it did 
not require the jury to find that Mr. Drake aided Ms. Tousley in committing the crimes. 
See R. 103, 105-06, 110; Addenda D, E, F. Instead, the elements instructions for the 
crimes (numbers 21 and 25) required the jury to determine whether Mr. Drake was the 
principal actor. 
Aiding and abetting is an essential element of a crime where the State is attempting 
to convict an individual under an accomplice theory rather than directly committing the 
crime. As the Utah Supreme Court ruled, the State "must prove all the elements of 
accomplice liability, including the mental state, beyond a reasonable doubt. . . ." Lopes. 
1999 UT 24, f 11; see also. State v. Scott. 732 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 1987) (recognizing 
that the actus reus for aiding and abetting is soliciting, requesting, encouraging, or 
intentionally aiding in the substantive offense); State v. Pacheco. 492 P.2d 1347, 1348 
(Utah 1972) ("Pacheco T\ affirmed on rehearing. State v. Pacheco. 495 P.2d 808, 808 
(Utah 1972), ("PachecoJI") (indicating that aiding and abetting and direct responsibility 
are two distinct theories involving distinct elements). In Lopes, for example, although the 
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Court directly addressed the constitutional limitations on enhancing sentences for crimes 
in which more than two persons participate, it clarified that aiding and abetting is an 
element of a crime which must also be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 1999 UT 24 ^ 
8-15. 
The trial court's elements instructions "wholly fail[ed] to instruct the jury" on the 
aiding and abetting element. Harmon. 712 P.2d at 292; see R. 105, 110. Those 
instructions informed the jury that to convict Mr. Drake it "must find from all of the 
evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements . . . 
." R. 105, 110 (emphasis added); Addenda E, F. The instructions then specifically listed 
and numbered the required elements. Aiding and abetting was noticeably absent from 
both instructions. R. 105, 110; Addenda E, F. Thus, the instructions communicated to 
the jury that a conviction required the jury to find only the listed elements and none 
others. 
Even viewing all of the instructions together, the trial judge never communicated 
to the jury that it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Drake aided and abetted 
Ms. Tousley. For the jury to understand that aiding and abetting was a distinct element of 
the offenses, the jury had to connect the accomplice liability instruction (number 19), the 
elements instructions (numbers 21 and 25) with the very first instruction which recited the 
charges in the Information. Specifically, Instruction number one which detailed the 
charges in the Information simply accused Mr. Drake of being "a party to the offense[s]." 
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R. 86. Nineteen instructions later, the trial judge defined the term "party" as either the 
principal actor or one who "solicited], requested], commanded], encourage[d], or 
intentionally aid[ed]" another who actually committed the crimes. R. 103; Addendum D. 
The trial judge neither defined those terms nor did she apply them to the facts of this case. 
She simply gave the jury the legal definition of a party. 
Even assuming the jury could link these two distant instructions, it must have then 
ignored the directives in the elements instructions to determine whether Mr. Drake was a 
principal and to limit its fact finding only to determining whether the State had proved 
"each and every5' one of the numbered elements. The jury must have then noticed that the 
elements instructions (numbers 21 and 25) also mentioned the "information." R. 105, 
110; Addenda E, F. To finally connect all of the instructions, the jury must have inferred 
that because the Information charged Mr. Drake with being a "party" to the offenses, the 
instructions required it to find beyond a reasonable doubt the unmentioned element that 
Mr. Drake aided and abetted Ms. Tousley as defined in Instruction number 19. 
No reasonable person, untrained in the law, is capable of performing such legal 
gymnastics. In the first place, "an information instruction is not a substitute for an 
elements instruction." Jones. 823 P.2d 1061. Second, the instruction ignored the Utah 
Supreme Court's warning not to instruct lay jurors using "arid, dense statutory language" 
without applying the law to the facts of the particular case. State v. Standiford. 769 P.2d 
254, 266 (Utah 1988). Third, even the prosecutor conceded during oral arguments that 
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he, after years of experience, had difficulty "comprehend[ing]" the jury instructions. R. 
150:123. The obscurity of the instructions were certainly even more mystifying to lay 
jurors. 
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Harmon. 712 P.2d 291 (Utah 
1986), further supports requiring the trial judge to accurately instruct a jury that it must 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant aided or abetted another. In Harmon, the 
State requested a lesser included offense instruction for attempted robbery in a case 
where the defendant was charged with robbery. Id. at 291. The trial court granted that 
request and instructed the jury on attempt by "merely insert[ing] the word 'attempted' 
before the word 'robbery' in the previously prepared instruction on the elements of the 
robbery." Id. The defendant was convicted of attempted robbery and appealed her 
conviction. Id. 
In Harmon, the Supreme Court reversed because the trial court failed to instruct 
the jury "that in order to convict of attempted robbery the jury must find, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that defendant's conduct constituted a 'substantial step' toward 
commission of the offense and the substantial step must be 'strongly corroborative' of 
defendant's intent to commit the offense." Id. at 291-92. Just like the failure to define 
"attempt," the trial judge below never explained to the jury that it must find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Mr. Drake "solicited], requested], command[ed], encourage[d] or 
intentionally aided" another in committing the crimes. 
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The failure to instruct the jury deprived Mr. Drake of other constitutional rights. 
Because the instructions did not require the jury to determine whether Mr. Drake aided 
Ms. Tousley, Mr. Drake lost his right to a jury trial. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 
119 S. Ct. 1827, 1835 (1999). The right to a jury trial specifically contemplates that 
jurors will decide each factual issue necessary to sustain a conviction: 
In criminal jury trials, questions of fact and the weight of the evidence are 
to be decided by the jury, absent waiver. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-10 
(1995); State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 589-90, 6 P.2d 177, 181 (1931) ("It is 
the sole and exclusive province of the jury to determine the facts in all 
criminal cases, whether the evidence offered is weak or strong, is in conflict 
or is not controverted."). 
Lopes, 1999 UT 24 % 16. 
Moreover, Article I, section 10 of the Utah Constitution guarantees the right to a 
unanimous jury verdict. See State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, fflf 60, 65, 992 P.2d 951 
(requirements of Article I, section 10 would not be met if jury was not given an elements 
instruction). Where a jury is not instructed on an element of a crime, the Article I, section 
10 unanimity requirement is not met. Id. 
B. The Court's Error In Failing to Properly Instruct the Jury Regarding 
the Element of Aiding and Abetting Requires a New Trial. 
These violations of Mr. Drake's constitutional rights require reversal. Although 
Mr. Drake did not object to the erroneous elements instruction, this Court will review a 
claim that the jury was erroneously instructed to avoid manifest injustice. Utah R. Crim. 
Proc. 19(c); State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 354 (1995). Manifest injustice occurs where 
20 
the trial judge fails to accurately instruct the jury on all of the elements of a crime. Jones. 
823 P.2d at 1061 ("The complete absence of an elements instruction on a crime is an error 
we review to avoid manifest injustice"); American Fork v. Carr. 970 P.2d 717, 720 (Utah 
App. 1998) (failure to properly instruct on elements "satisfies manifest injustice standard 
under Rule 19(c)" and requires a new trial); State v. Lesley. 672 P.2d 79, 81 (Utah 1983) 
(defendant's conviction for trespass reversed to avoid manifest injustice where elements 
instruction misstated law of criminal trespass); Laine, 618 P.2d at 35 (reversible error 
occurs where trial judge fails to instruct jury on all elements of a crime). This omission 
"constitutes reversible error as a matter of law." Gibson. 908 P.2s at 354 (defendant's 
conviction reversed to avoid manifest injustice where jury was not instructed that lack of 
consent was an element of forcible sexual abuse). 
Without explicitly conducting a traditional plain error review, this Court and the 
Utah Supreme Court have repeatedly held that the manifest injustice standard requires 
reversal where the trial judge fails to accurately instruct the jury on the elements of a 
crime. See e.g. Can, 970 P.2d at 720 ("This court has consistently held that '[fjailure to 
give an elements instruction for a crime satisfies the manifest injustice standard under 
Rule 19(c) and constitutes reversible error as a matter of law.'") (quoting Gibson. 908 
P.2d at 354); Laine. 618 P.2d at 35 (failure to instruct on all elements of a crime is 
reversible error). While that precedent requires reversal in this case, a traditional plain 
error review likewise mandates reversal since the error in instructing the jury was "plain" 
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or "manifest" and "of sufficient magnitude that it affects the substantial rights of 
[Appellant]." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 1989) (indicating that "in most 
circumstances, the term 'manifest injustice' is synonymous with the 'plain error' 
standard" which requires that an error be "plain" or "manifest" and "of sufficient 
magnitude that it affects the substantial rights of a party"). 
The error in failing to instruct the jury on the element of aiding and abetting was 
plain and manifest under Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-202, Pacheco L Pacheco II. Scott, 
and the recent Utah Supreme Court decision in Lopes. As outlined above, these cases and 
the statute establish that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided another. 
The error in failing to instruct the jury that it must find that element beyond a reasonable 
doubt was therefore obvious. 
The error also affected Appellant's substantial rights. As the Utah Supreme Court 
and this Court have repeatedly stated, the failure to accurately instruct the jury on the 
elements of the crime "is reversible error as a matter of law." Jones. 823 P.2d at 1061; 
Laine. 618 P.2d at 35; Gibson. 908 P.2d at 354. In fact, failure to accurately instruct the 
jury on the elements "is reversible error that can never be considered harmless." State v. 
Souza. 846 P.2d 1313, 1320 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing Jones. 823 P.2d at 1061). Thus, 
the error in this case requires reversal. 
Although several recent cases appear on the surface to contest this conclusion, they 
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have no application here. In State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1292 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994), this Court held that the failure to instruct the jury on the element of non-marriage 
in a rape case did not require reversal. Because the non-marriage element was never at 
issue at trial and "all testimony at trial clearly and indisputably established that defendant 
and [the victim] were not married," this Court held that manifest injustice did not occur in 
failing to instruct the jury on that element. Id. Stevenson presented a unique 
circumstance where not only was the evidence that the defendant and victim were not 
married clear and indisputable, but the non-marriage element had been deleted from the 
statute and no longer was included as an element of the crime when this Court reviewed 
Stevenson's conviction. Id. Given these unique circumstances, this Court upheld the 
conviction. 
Following Stevenson, in Cam this Court reiterated the rule that failure to give an 
accurate elements instruction requires reversal as a matter of law. Can, 970 P.2d at 720. 
In Cam the trial judge failed to instruct the jury that one of the elements of lewdness was 
the intent to derive sexual gratification. Id. Because the instruction did not include this 
element, this Court reversed the conviction as a matter of law without conducting a 
review for prejudice. Id. 
Stevenson does not control nor does it provide a basis for departing from Utah 
Supreme Court holdings. The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that failure to 
accurately instruct on the elements of a crime is manifest error requiring reversal as a 
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matter of law. Moreover, this Court has reiterated that position after issuing Stevenson. 
Even if Stevenson did control, it would not apply in this case where the evidence 
regarding the missing element was not clear and indisputable, and instead, was 
controverted. 
The Utah Supreme Court's opinions in State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, 999 P.2d 7 and 
State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 63, 401 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, do not alter this conclusion. First, 
those cases did not involve a review for manifest injustice in failing to instruct a jury on 
the elements. Instead, they analyzed whether the trial court erred in enhancing sentences 
for crimes involving more than two people, and if so, whether that error required reversal. 
Kohl, 2000 UT 35 at fflf 26-31; Veteto, 2000 UT 62 at fflf 10-12. Because the Court was 
not reviewing for manifest injustice, the Court never even contemplated overruling the 
Laine line of cases which require reversal as a matter of law when the jury is not 
instructed on an element. 
Moreover, as the Utah Supreme Court recently ruled, Kohl and Veteto are limited 
to their unique facts in which "two co-defendants were found guilty in the same trial of 
identical charges by the jury that convicted the defendant." State v. Helmick, 2000 UT 70 
116, 402 Utah Adv. Rep. 27. In other words, reversal was not required because the jury 
had actually made the necessary finding allowing the trial court to impose the gang 
enhancement as a matter of law. Given the unique circumstances in Kohl and Veteto and 
the Court's failure to address Laine and other controlling case law, those cases do not 
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overrule the Laine line of cases. 
In the present case, the unique circumstances of Kohl and Veteto are not present. 
Since the jury was not instructed that aiding and abetting is an element of the crime, let 
alone given a definition of aiding and abetting, the jury did not find that Mr. Drake aided 
and abetted Ms. Tousley. And, contrary to the group enhancement, Mr. Drake's alleged 
aiding and abetting was squarely at issue. Although Ms. Tousley claimed that Mr. Drake 
devised the scheme to defraud, she totally lacked credibility given her repeated 
contradictory statements and perjurious testimony. Her trial testimony provided no basis 
for concluding that the jury correctly found that Mr. Drake aided and abetted. The State 
presented no other evidence showing that Mr. Drake participated in or had knowledge of 
Ms. Tousley's actions. 
The United States Supreme Court decision in Neder v. United States. 119 S. Ct. 
1827 (1999), similarly does not apply. In Neder, the Court applied harmless error 
analysis to a trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on an element of the crime. 119 S. Ct. 
at 1837. That holding does not apply to Utah appellate courts because they are "not 
required to apply federal standards of review when presented with challenges to trial 
court determinations made under federal law." State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1265 
(Utah 1993). Indeed, this Court is required to follow the mandate of the Utah Supreme 
Court and conclude that the failure to accurately instruct a jury on all of the elements of a 
crime requires reversal as a matter of law. See Jones, 823 P.2d at 1061; Laine, 618 P.2d 
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at 35; see also, Harmon, 712 P.2d at 292 (Utah Supreme Court refuses state's request that 
it conduct a harmless error review where trial court failed to instruct the jury on the basic 
elements of the crime). 
Regardless of federal law, the error below involves a violation not only of federal 
due process, but also of state due process and Article I, section 10 of the Utah 
Constitution. See Lopes, 1999 UT 24 If 13, 14; Saunders, 1999 UT 59 ^ 60. Utah is, 
thus, free to continue finding that such violations of the state constitution require reversal 
as a matter of law. 
Even if this Court were to conduct a harmless error review, the conviction in this 
case must be overturned because the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In reviewing a constitutional violation for harmlessness, this Court must determine 
whether the error was "'harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Genovesi, 909 
P.2d 916, 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Scott v. State, 465 P.2d 620, 622 (Nev. 
1970)). This standard required the State to show that the missing aiding and abetting 
element was "supported by uncontroverted evidence." Neder, 119 S.Ct. at 1838. 
When determining whether an error in instructing on the elements was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the reviewing court does not "'become in effect a second jury 
to determine whether the defendant is guilty.'" Id. at 1839 (quoting R. Traynor, The 
Riddle of Harmless Error 50 (1970)). Nor does the reviewing Court conduct a sufficiency 
of the evidence review. Instead, the reviewing court considers whether the evidence on 
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the missing element is controverted, i.e., "whether the record contains evidence that could 
rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element." Id. at 1839; see 
also, Saunders. 1999 UT 59, ^  65 (holding that violation of juror unanimity requirement 
demand new trial where jurors could have made different findings from the controverted 
evidence). 
Given Ms. Tousley's repeated lies, the evidence as to whether Mr. Drake solicited, 
requested, commanded, or intentionally aided Ms. Tousley was controverted. The only 
evidence supporting the State's theory that Mr. Drake solicited Ms. Tousley to commit 
the crimes came from Ms. Tousley herself, but she lacked any credibility whatsoever. 
She invented a story about loaning her ATM card and personal identification number 
when she spoke with America First's director of security, she concealed from police the 
fact that she retained $500 as payment for depositing the forged check, and she 
perpetuated this lie even though she was under oath at the preliminary hearing. She lied 
further when she claimed to have withdrawn the money in two transactions when bank 
records showed she withdrew the money at once. 
Ms. Tousley continued her lies at trial when she denied printing on the back of the 
check "payed to the order of in addition to her name even though the handwriting 
appears to be the same. Moreover, contrary to her testimony, it appears that different 
persons printed her name and then endorsed the check. Exhibit 1. Further, bank records 
establish that she deposited the second check on April 30, 1998, rather than April 29, 
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1998, which she represented at trial. 
In addition to these fabrications, at trial, Ms. Tousley contradicted her statement to 
the police that she had worked with Mr. Drake at Taco Bell. She also gave conflicting 
stories about whether Mr. Drake and his friend accompanied her to withdraw the money 
or whether Mr. Drake met her at America First. Likewise, contrary to the preliminary 
hearing testimony, Ms. Tousley claimed at trial that she did not print the phrase "payed to 
the order o f on the back of the first check. 
The failure to instruct the jury on aiding and abetting can hardly be considered 
harmless given these lies and conflicting stories. As the sole source of Mr. Drake's 
purported aiding and abetting, Ms. Tousley lacked credibility and reliability. This case 
epitomizes controverted evidence. Mr. Drake's convictions cannot withstand such 
scrutiny. 
II. AT TRIAL, MR. DRAKE DID NOT RECEIVE THE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH 
AMENDMENT. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Utah Constitution 
Article 1, section 12 guarantee a criminal defendant the right to effective assistance of 
counsel in defending all claims asserted against him in a court of law. There is a two-
prong test used to determine whether someone has been rendered ineffective assistance of 
counsel at trial. See Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 104 S. 
Ct. 2052 (1984), State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). "First, the defendant 
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must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires a showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Alvarez 
v. Galetka. 933 P.2d 987 (Utah 1997). 
A. Trial Counsel Was Ineffective When He Waived Objection to the 
Faulty Jury Instructions. 
The two alleged errors of trial counsel in this case meet the two-prong test found in 
Strickland and used by this Court. Proper jury instructions are an essential element of a 
fair trial guaranteed by both the federal and state constitutions. Failure to preserve the 
issue of the propriety of the instructions is not a tactical decision, but rather it is negligent 
of the necessity of jury instructions that include all elements of the charged offense. 
Further, trial counsel's failure to object to the incomplete jury instructions constituted 
manifest injustice. Manifest injustice occurs where the trial judge fails to accurately 
instruct the jury on all of the elements of a charged offense. State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059 
(Utah 1991). 
If the jury had been fully instructed on the elements of the crime, they would have 
been required to find the Defendant guilty of the aiding and abetting element. The jury 
must have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant solicited, requested, 
commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided the principal actor to perpetuate the fraud. 
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The State failed to establish that the Defendant was guilty of the aforementioned aiding 
and abetting. By denying the jury the opportunity to consider this element, the Defendant 
was prejudiced. The inclusion of this element in the instructions for the jury's 
consideration would have resulted in a different outcome as there was no evidence that 
actually supported the finding of guilt as a principal actor. Trial counsel's waiver of 
objection to the jury instructions was clearly in error and resulted in a denial of the 
Defendant's right to a fair trial. 
B. Trial Counsel Failed to Fully Investigate and Obtain Witnesses to 
Testify on Behalf of Mr. Drake. 
Trial counsel also erred by failing to investigate potential witnesses to testify for 
the Defendant at trial. The Defendant was aware of the identity of the actual perpetrator 
of the fraud. See Addendum M, affidavit of Brian William Drake. The Defendant 
provided counsel with this information, but counsel failed to investigate or inquire further 
regarding the potential witness. The information given to counsel by Mr. Drake regarding 
the other witness was exculpatory evidence and counsel's failure to investigate this 
prejudiced Defendant. In State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990), the Utah 
Supreme Court found: 
If counsel does not adequately investigate the underlying facts of a case, 
including the availability of prospective defense witnesses, counsel's 
performance cannot fall within the 'wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance.' This is because a decision not to investigate cannot be 
considered a tactical decision. It is only after an adequate inquiry has been 
made that counsel can make a reasonable decision to call or not to call 
particular witnesses for tactical reasons." 
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Quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 686. 
The Defendant's trial counsel failed to investigate possible defense witnesses to 
testify at trial even after the Defendant provided him with the name of the man he 
believed to be responsible for the alleged fraud. This failure of counsel to fully 
investigate all of the facts denied the Defendant effective assistance of counsel and Mr. 
Drake was prejudiced as a result. There is a reasonable probability that had the witness 
been called to testify, the outcome at trial would have been different, thus satisfying the 
two-prong Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel analysis. 
III. GIVEN MS. TOUSLEY'S TOTAL LACK OF CREDIBILITY AND MR. 
DRAKE'S TENUOUS CONNECTION TO THE CRIMES, THE STATE 
PRESENTED INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT MR. DRAKE OF 
THE CHARGES. 
Irrespective of the faulty jury instructions, the State failed to present sufficient 
evidence to convict Mr. Drake. This Court must reverse a conviction for lack of evidence 
when the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime. State v. 
Giles, 966 P.2d 872, 876 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). This appeal involves just such a case, 
given Ms. Tousley's lack of credibility and the absence of evidence even hinting that Mr. 
Drake participated in the crimes. 
The undisputed marshaled evidence reveals the following: 
1. Ms. Westlake lived at 149 South 700 East for seven years until August of 1997. 
R. 150: 107 
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2. Although Ms. Westlake had closed her account with Providian prior to April 
28, 1998, Providian continued to send her $3,000 cash advance checks that, if cashed 
would reopen her account. R. 150: 109. 
3. Ms. Westlake received her mail through a slot in her front door. R. 150: 108. 
4. Ms. Westlake did not know Mr. Drake or Ms. Tousley and she did not 
authorize either of them to sign her name on her behalf. R. 150: 112, 94-95. 
5. Mr. Drake was living in Ms. Westlake's former apartment on April 28, 1998, 
to May 1, 1998. R. 150: 112-13. 
6. On April 28, 1998, Ms. Tousley endorsed a Providian check for $3,000 that 
was payable to Ms. Westlake and then deposited into her bank account. The check was 
dated March 27, 1998. R. 150: 70-71. 
7. The same person appears to have printed on the back of the check "payed to 
the order of Cathi Tousley." Some unidentified person forged Ms. Westlake's signature. 
R. 150: 81-82. 
8. On April 19, 1998, Ms. Tousley withdrew $2,500 from her bank account. 
Exhibit 3. 
9. On April 30, 1998, she deposited another Providian check made out to Ms. 
Westlake in the amount of $3,000. That check was dated April 27, 1998. R. 150: 93-94. 
10. When an America First security investigator confronted Ms. Tousley about 
these incidents, she claimed to have loaned her ATM card and personal identification 
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number to some fiiends. She claimed she did not know what they had done with the card. 
R. 150: 104-05. 
At trial, Ms. Tousley presented the following information for the first time: 
1. Mr. Drake asked her to deposit the checks into her bank account because Ms. 
Westlake owed him money and he did not have an account in Utah. R. 150: 68-70 
2. As payment for Ms. Tousley's help, Mr. Drake offered to let her keep $500 of 
each of the $3,000 transactions. R. 150: 70. 
3. The day after depositing the first check, Ms. Tousley met Mr. Drake at an 
American First branch where Ms. Tousley withdrew $2,500 and gave it to Mr. Drake. R. 
150: 72. 
4. Ms. Tousley claimed that when she informed Mr. Drake that America First had 
placed a hold on the second check, he became angry, threatened her, and left messages on 
her answering machine. R. 150: 150: 75, 87-88. 
It is further argued that Ms. Tousley offered the following false statements and 
perjurious testimony: 
1. She informed the police that she had worked with Mr. Drake at Taco Bell, but 
denied at trial ever working with or seeing him there. R. 150: 67-68, 85. 
2. She initially told the police that Mr. Drake and a friend of his had accompanied 
her to deposit the first check but maintained at trial that she met Mr. Drake at an America 
First branch. R. 150:72. 
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3. At trial, Ms. Tousley denied ever telling the police that Mr. Drake had driven 
her to the bank to withdraw the money. R. 150: 88. 
4. At her trial, Ms. Tousley retracted her preliminary hearing testimony in which 
she asserted that she had written on the back of the first check "payed to the order of." R. 
150: 70-71, 79. 
5. Although a casual inspection of the first check reveals that the same person 
who wrote "payed to the order o f appears to have printed Ms. Tousley's name, Ms. 
Tousley claimed at trial that she only printed her name. Exhibit 1. 
6. Contrary to Ms. Tousley's stoiy, different persons appear to have printed her 
name and then endorsed the check. 
7. She lied to the police and under oath at the preliminary hearing when she 
claimed to have withdrawn the entire $3,000 in two separate transactions and then given 
it to Mr. Drake. 
8. Bank records refute Ms. Tousley's trial testimony that she deposited the second 
check on April 29, 1998. She actually deposited that check on April 30, 1998. Exhibit 3. 
Because Ms. Tousley's allegations alone link Mr. Drake to the crimes, the 
sufficiency of the evidence hinges on her credibility. Given Ms. Tousley's chronic lies, 
her testimony lacks any weight and cannot be trusted. She lied to the bank security 
officer about loaning her ATM card and Personal identification number to someone. 
When the police confronted her, she blamed Mr. Drake and invented a story about 
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working with him and traveling to America First with him and a fiiend to withdraw all of 
the money in two separate transactions. She reasserted these lies under oath at the 
preliminary hearing. 
Ms. Tousley purported to reveal her true involvement in the scheme only when 
confronted by the police and prosecutors just before trial. When presumably shown her 
bank records which demonstrated that she kept $500 for herself, she realized that she had 
to explain why she had not revealed the payment previously. Only after placing herself in 
this precarious situation did she allege, for the first time, that Mr. Drake had threatened 
her. 
Her lies continued at trial. Although bank records indisputably established that she 
withdrew $2,500 on April 30, 1998, she testified that she recorded this transaction on 
April 29. Even more disturbing, Ms. Tousley admitted to lying at the preliminary hearing 
and claimed that she had only printed her name and had not written "payed to the order 
o f even though the same person appears to have written that phrase and her name. The 
check reveals further that Ms. Tousley lied when she claimed that she both printed her 
name and endorsed the check. In essence, at each stage of the proceedings, Ms. Tousley 
fabricated and embellished the facts as it suited her needs. Reasonable persons could not 
have believed her testimony. 
The State presented no other evidence linking Mr. Drake to the crimes. Since the 
State could not show who forged Ms. Westlake's signature, the evidence did not support 
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the forgery conviction under a principal theory. Further, the State produced no bank 
records or other documents indicating that Mr. Drake actually received the $2,500. No 
other person implicated Mr. Drake in the crimes. The State's case solely stemmed from a 
known liar's accusations. 
The only possible evidence that even hints to Mr. Drake's participation was the 
fact that he was residing in Ms. Westlake's former residence from April 28 to May 1, 
1998. That evidence fails to implicate him in the crimes at all. Mr. Drake was charged 
and convicted for the forgery and theft relating only to the check dated March 27, 1998. 
The State presented no evidence concerning who lived at Ms. Westlake's former 
residence between the date of the check and April 28, 1998. 
This time gap prevented the jury from connecting Mr. Drake to the crimes. In 
State v. Kalisz. 735 P.2d 60, 61 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court found a much 
narrower gap insufficient to show a defendant's guilt. The defendant in that case dropped 
off a friend at a used car lot. The friend then pretended to "test drive" a used car for 
several hours, but actually used it to rob a store. Kalisz returned the car to the used car 
dealer within minutes after the robbery. He also lied to the police about taking his friend 
to the hospital for an appendicitis attack. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that the State's 
failure to place Kalisz at the robbery or to connect him to any stolen goods was 
insufficient to prove his involvement in the robbery or that "he had the requisite mental 
state." Id. 
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This case presents an even stronger case for insufficient evidence. A month 
separated the mailing of the first check and its deposit and Mr. Drake's residency at the 
apartment. Like in Kalisz. the State presented no evidence linking Mr. Drake to the 
$2,500 that Ms. Tousley withdrew from her account. Additionally, the State could not 
show who forged Ms. Westlake's signature. These gaps prevented the State from 
establishing that Mr. Drake participated in the forgery or that he had any intent to 
participate. 
Admittedly, the second check was apparently mailed during Mr. Drake's 
residency at Ms. Westlake's former apartment. But, the State did not charge Mr. Drake 
with any crimes connected with that check. At any rate, possession of the second check 
fails to prove either that Mr. Drake possessed the first one, gave it to Ms. Tousley, or 
asked her to deposit it. Likewise, the State did not show who lived in the apartment 
when the first check was delivered or if other people had access to the apartment while 
Mr. Drake lived there. Other than Ms. Tousley's incredible testimony, the State 
presented no evidence showing how she possessed the first check or that Mr. Drake ever 
handled it. The delivery of the second check simply fails to resolve the critical issues 
necessary to showing that Mr. Drake gave the first check to Ms. Tousley and asked her to 
deposit it. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant Brian William Drake requests this Court to reverse his convictions for 
lack of evidence or to reverse and remand for a new trial because the trial judge failed to 
properly instruct the jury. 
DATED this <P^ day of February, 2001 
STEPM^NIE AMES 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 3 2000 
OtputyCtortc 
ay. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs. 
BRIAN WILLIAM DRAKE, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
NOTICE 
Case No: 991902669 FS 
Judge: LESLIE A. LEWIS 
Date: March 3 , 2 0 0 0 
ENTERED IN HhblSTRY 
OF JUOGMENTS 
OATE.f^-'7-^ 
PRESENT 
Clerk: chells 
Prosecutor: VINCE MEISTER 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JEFFREY W. HALL 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: April 15, 1973 
Video 
Tape Number: 12:10 pm 
CHARGES 
1. FORGERY - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/1999 Guilty Plea 
2. THEFT BY DECEPTION - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 11/15/1999 Guilty Plea 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FORGERY a 3rd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
nM»Ha.l..S?.,:!?[l.<:?:.t'ud9r,ier:t commitment 
Page 1 
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Case No: 991902669 
Date: Mar 03, 2000 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Count 1 and 2 are to run consecutive to each other. 
Total Fine: $500.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $425.00 
Total Principal Due: $925.00 
Plus Interest 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Restitution: Amount: $2917,50 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: ATTN BETH CAMPBELL AMERICA FIRST 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 925.00 where the surcharge has been 
added to the fine. Interest may increase the final amount due. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with amy people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
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Case No: 991902669 
Date: Mar 03, 2000 
Enforcement Officer. 
Violate no laws. 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
Serve 10 days in jail with credit for 10 days served. 
Enter into and complete the out patient Odyssey House program. 
Show proof to the court have been accepted within 30 days of today. 
Leave in approved housing by APPD. 
No contact with co-defendant Catherine Tousley. 
Pay restitution jointly and severally with co-defendant in the 
amount of $2917.05 to America First. 
Monthly payments in the amount of $150.00 towards restitution. 
Full time work within 30 days 
REVIEW HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 05/26/2000 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - N44 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: LESLIE A. LEWIS 
Dated t h i s 5' day of m ^ 20 
JAM/ 
JSSLIE A. LEWIS 
District Court Judge 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third 
District Court at 238-7300 at least three working daxa^grior to the 
proceeding. The general information phone numbei^3^^80^238-7300. 
H ••,/ ,- \ . \ \ 
./ 
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ADDENDUM B 
HLED D ^ S I C T C3URT 
Third Judicial District 
NOV I 5 £C3 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
R e p l a y Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIAN WILLIAM DRAKE, 
Defendant • 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
CRIMINAL NO. 991902669 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
You are instructed that the defendant BRIAN WILLIAM DRAKE is 
charged by the Information which has been duly filed with the 
commission of FORGERY and THEFT BY DECEPTION . The Information 
alleges: 
FORGERY, a Third Degree Felony, at 3190 South Richmond Street, 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about April 28, 1998, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 501, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended, in that the defendant, BRIAN WILLIAM DRAKE, a 
party to the offense, did alter, make, complete, execute, 
authenticate, issue, transfer, publish, or utter any writing so 
that the writing or the making, completion, execution, 
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance 
purported to be the act of another, with a purpose to defraud. 
THEFT BY DECEPTION, a Third Degree Felony, at 3190 South 
Richmond Street, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about 
April 28, 1998, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 405, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, BRIAN 
WILLIAM DRAKE, a party to the offense, obtained or exercised 
control over the property of America First Credit Union by 
deception, with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and that 
the value of said property is or exceeds $1,000, but is less than 
$5,000. 
ADDENDUM C 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
You are instructed that to the Information the defendant 
has entered a plea of not guilty. The plea of not guilty 
denies each of the essential allegations of the charges 
contained in the Information and casts upon the State the 
burden of proving each to your satisfaction and beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
ADDENDUM D 
INSTRUCTION NO. < 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the 
commission of the offense who directly commits the offense, who 
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids 
another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense 
shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
ADDENDUM E 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
Before you can convict the defendant, BRIAN WILLIAM DRAKE, 
of the offense of Forgery as charged in count I of the 
information, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of 
that offense: 
1. That on or about the 28th day of April, 1998, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, BRIAN WILLIAM DRAKE, 
intentionally or knowingly made, executed, issued or uttered a 
writing; and 
2. That said writing or utterance purported to be the act 
of Patricia R. Westlake; and 
3. That said writing or utterance was not the act of 
Patricia R. Westlake; and 
4. That said writing or utterance was not authorized by 
Patricia R. Westlake; and 
5. That the said defendant then and there knew the 
writing was not the act of Patricia R. Westlake and was not 
authorized by Patricia R. Westlake; and 
6. That the said defendant then and there had a purpose 
to defraud. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Forgery as charged in count I 
of the information. If, on the other hand, you are not 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the 
INSTRUCTION NO. "^  
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foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty 
of count I. 
\o\> 
ADDENDUM F 
INSTRUCTION NO, ^ -
Before you can convict the defendant, BRIAN WILLIAM DRAKE, 
of the offense of Theft by Deception as charged in count II of 
the information, you must find from all of the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following 
elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 28th day of April, 1998, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, BRIAN WILLIAM DRAKE, 
intentionally or knowingly obtained or exercised control over 
the property of America First Credit Union; and 
2. That the defendant obtained or exercised control over 
such property by deception; and 
3. That the defendant obtained or exercised control over 
such property with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof; and 
4. That the value of the property was or exceeded 
$1,000.00 but was less than $5,000,00. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Theft by Deception as charged 
in count II of the information. If, on the other hand, you are 
not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of 
the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not 
guiltv of count II. 
ADDENDUM G 
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission 
of offense or for conduct of another. 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an 
ofiFense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which 
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
ADDENDUM H 
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing* defined. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any 
such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, pub-
lishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, 
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance 
purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or 
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a 
numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an 
original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section, "writing* includes printing, electronic storage or 
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information including 
forms such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, 
money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification; 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued 
by a government or any agency, or 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing 
representing an interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary 
interest in or claim against any person or enterprise. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree. 
ADDENDUM I 
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
76-6-405. Theft by deception. 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of 
another by deception and with a purpose to deprive hi™ thereof. 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as 
to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements unlikely 
to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing* means an 
exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in communications addressed to 
the public or to a class or group. 
ADDENDUM J 
CONSTTTDTION OP UTAH 
Sec 7. [Dae process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without doe process 
of law. 
ADDENDUM K 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
ADDENDUM L 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT HV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens ghall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove 3uch 
disability. 
Sec. 1 [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but ail such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation 
provisions of this amcie. 
ADDENDUM M 
Stephanie Ames (#6466) 
GUSTIN, CHRISTIAN, SKORDAS, 
& CASTON, L.L.C. 
Suite 810 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7444 
Attorney for Defendant 
In the Utah Court of Appeals 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
v. 
BRIAN WILLIAM DRAKE 
Defendant/Defendant 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRIAN 
WILLIAM DRAKE 
I W No 'DOOOr^ K-C V 
1, Brian William Drake, being first duly sworn, depose and say as follows: 
I I .iin the il >'iitj,jnlaiif \\\ ilic jhove-mentioned case. 
2. I provided trial counsel, Jef&ey Hall, with information regarding the actual 
perpetrator of the fraud I was charged with. 
3 Mr. Hall failed to further inquire about the information I provided him with 
regarding Iht: invol' 'wiitriil <>l another person. 
4. Mr Hall failed to investigate the possibility that someone other than myself was 
responsible for the alleged acts. 
5. I gave Mr. Hall the name and address for a witness who would assist in 
the defense of my case. The name and current information for that witness is Aaron 
Wane, 603 Cornwall Way, Fruitland, ID 83619. 
Further, Affiant sayeth not. 
DATED this / / day of Pt£&«tffj£. 2000. 
Brian William Drake 
Subscribed and sworn before me on this \ °\ day of fi-^^A^Jo^ , 2000. 
Notary Public ^ 
My Commission S 3 » » 
Residing at: * /yftsS&ya ttE*chtng»fl«*s».eio I 
' \&CXw/JJ MyCorraniHionCjfliwi | 
^ V ^ J J ^ State of Utah J 
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EXHIBIT 1 
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•AY Three Thousand DoUars and No Cents 
54-197/114 
March 27,1998 
$3,000.00 
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EXHIBIT 3 
AMERICA FIRST 
ER SYSTEM 
VlO/98 
::r 
G -3 
1 M 3 
3698 
3698 
^698 
3698 
3798 
3798 
3798 
.098 
1198 
1198 
1598 
1798 
.898 
2898 
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2998 
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3098 
490900-8 
4J098 
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3019 
3019 
3019 
1647 
2060 
CREDIT UNION 
AMERICA FIRST CREDIT UNION 
SUBLEDGER INQUIRY 
CATHERINE B~TOUSLEY LOW DATE - 4/01/98 HIGH DATE 
JJU.. FOLIO SDESC SC 
***** SHARE 
SFTV ATM41 SFX9 
D TV 03790 
***** SHARE 
SDCR 2751 
SWCD 2796 
SWCD 2871 
SDCR 5476 
SWCD ATMPL 
040798924031UT SALT LAKE, 405 
2060 
3015 
3023 
2060 
STTV ATMPL FEENT 
SWCD 5968 
SDCR 1934 
SWCD ATMPL 
041298146051UT SALT LAKE, 828 
42098 
2060 
2042 
1605 
2041 
3005 
1633 
2042 
3019 
1619 
2060 
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SWCD ATM42 S 
SDCR 7426 
SWCD ATM41 S 
SDCR 5428 
SWCD 7792 
SDCR ATM42 
SWCD C1003 
SWCD 9516 
SWCD ATMPL 
043098219111UT SALT LAKE, 195^ 
JNCTION 
2060 
2007 
2041 
STTV ATMPL FEENT 
SDCR ATM07 
STTV ATM41 SFX1 
TASK 
START - PAGE 
AMOUNT INTEREST PRINCIPAL 
SUB-ACCOUNT 1 ***** 
110.00 
.09 
SUB-ACCOUNT 9 ***** 
67.19 
-643.75 
-30.00 
81.08 
-21.50 
SOUTH MAIN ST 
-1.00 
-30.00 
54.32 
-61.50 
. 920 W. 
-1.00 
-20.00 
33.71 
-40.00 
37.08 
-2 ).00 
3,000.00 -^., 
-81.29 
-2,500.00 • . , , • 
-301.50 
W CALIFORNIA 
-1.00
 f. ri:. 
3,000.00 v r 1. 
-110.00 /vf: ;"'••'•••• • ;{-
• • • 
13:06:54 
- 5/01/98 
- 01 
BALANCE 
25.71 
135.71 
135.80 
613.45 
680.64 
36.89 
6.89 
87.97 
66.47 
65.47 
35.47 
89.79 
28.29 
27.29 
7.29 
41.00 
1.00 
38.08 
18.08 
3,018.08 ' 
2,936.79 
. 436.79 
135.29 
134.29 
3,134.29 
"3,024.29 
( AISUBLED - 11/18/97 - 13:23:00 ) 
(01/SECR/BETH CAMPBELL ) 
With You In Mind 
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